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"Lawyers specialising in labour law agree that the individual contract of service
is 'the corner stone of the edifice' of labour law." I
It can be no surprise that this should be so in respect of the individual
relationship between aworker and the employer: it ismuch harder to envisage the
individual contract of service controlling, or perhaps more accurately greatly
influencing, the collective relationships between trade union and employer.
Labour law has been a slow, evolutionary growth, depending on an often unhappy
mixture of common law and statute. In a very English way the basic principles,
though much talked about,2 have neither authority nor do they guide the
legislator, who is normally wearing political blinkers and rushing to remedy a
perceived abuse,3 or the courts who tend to busy themselves interpreting the
documents put before them as literally as possible, be they contracts or statutes.4
There is a generally accepted tendency to make an important basic classification
between individual and collective labour law. Although it is an obvious and a
sensible classification for overall purposes and for teaching, it is not a clear and
precise distinction and so can often be misleading. There are several
complications. For example, the individual contract of service, when collective
bargaining is established, is largely derived from the collective bargain between
the employer and trade union which has as its principal purpose the fixing of at
least the central terms of the individual worker's contract of employment.
Happily, as far as the individual worker is concerned, the legal doctrine of
incorporation is called in aid to marry the two, for without such wedding the terms
• Professor of Law, University of Sheffield.
1. Charles G. Hanson and Graham Mather, Striking Out Strikes, lEA, Hobart Paper 110, 1988.The
phrase quoted is from O. Kahn Freund.
2. The discussion of 'the right to strike' is the best example of the difference between the political and
the legal approach in Great Britain.
3. The industrial legislation since the Employment Act 1980 clearly shows this approach, especially
when compared with the Industrial Relations Act 1971.
4. A series of three cases reaching results by means of interpretation of statute which ran completely
counterto what was expected areNWL Ltd. v.Nelson [1979] I.c.R. 867,Express Newspapers Ltd. v.
McShane [1980] I.R.L.R. 35 and Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [1980] I.R.L.R. 116.
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agreed collectively would fail to secure his position, since it is traditional that the
collective bargain is not to be regarded as legally binding.s
History shows that employment relations emerged from status and have been,
for a very long time, firmly rooted in contract. The theory of contract gave the
employer and worker (the contemporary jargon wasmaster and servant) the power
to determine in detail the particular terms that would apply to their relationship.
In practice, such has been the general neglect of strict legal processes, only a
handful of terms were in fact specifically agreed.6 The contract has been
traditionally 'filled in' by the implication of either 'customary terms' or terms
which have obviously been assumed to exist in practice and so have been deemed
to be implied into the agreement and in that way become part of the contract and
legally binding. In practice this has meant that the judges, in the name of public
policy, 'discovered' a framework of standard terms which were applied to different
types of contract. Outside the field of collective bargaining the employer was often
merely offering a 'contract of adhesion' with virtually no chance for the terms to be
bargained. The fundamental notion that a contract is the freely accepted result of a
detailed bargaining process was, therefore, though correct in theory nonetheless a
relatively inaccurate way of indicating what was happening in practice, especially
where collective bargaining was absent. Real agreement was illusory for even
within the ambit of collective bargaining the terms agreed were by no means
comprehensive and much of importance was left uncovered.
Collective bargaining is the normal expression of a positive relationship
between a trade union, and by implication its members, on the one hand and an
employers' association or individual employer on the other. A strike, that is to say
the co-ordinated withdrawal of labour, is the ultimate result of a fractured
relationship. It is the workers' counter to the power of an employer to impose
terms and conditions of work. Without such action being protected, it has been
generally recognised, the safeguard of collectivism is seriously emasculated and
will fail to protect the worker. This is not the place to discuss whether strikes
should be allowed, or if allowed how they should be regulated. There has been, for
much of this century and in most of the industrialised world, a consensus that
labour needs the protection of such 'right to strike'. The inverted commas are
necessary because to some the phrase means an unfettered right, although
prudence would suggest that there must be some reasonable limitations. The most
comprehensive statement of the generally accepted position are the key I.L.O.
conventions,7 ratified by a very large number of states8 and discussed fully in a
5. A challenge to this assumption, based on the attitude in the U.S.A., by Ford Motors failed: Ford
MOlorCompany v.AEUF and TGWU [1969] 2Q.B. 303. Perhaps surprisingly this assumption has not
been seen as an object for change.
6. Until the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 it was not necessary for the worker even to be given a
record of the principal terms of his contract.
7. The principal Conventions are No. 87, No. 98 setting out fundamental rights and the more recent
No. 151 dealing with the public sector.
8. There are over 100ratifications of Conventions No. 87 (1948) and No. 98 (1949) and about 20 of the
much more recently promulgated No. 151 (1978).
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general survey by that body's Committee of Experts.9 The reader who looks at
footnotes will however have noted the title of the academic pamphlet quoted at the
outset which reflects a more hostile attitude - Striking out Stn'kes, indicating that
there is another view, one which appears to be growing strongly in some countries
at the present time.
It has already been indicated that phrases such as 'the right to strike' have no
real place in the Anglo-Saxon type legal system. Even where such a right appears
to exist it will be found to be considerably hedged about. Since collective
withdrawal of labour is in certain circumstances inevitable, English law has
naturally regulated striking by way of statute. The first principal modern statute
was the Trade Disputes Act 1906,which though both regulatory and restrictive,
proved to be sowide as to require little in the way of reform until modern times.10
It was inevitable, even without a shift in politic!!lopinion, that changes in patterns
of work and in the organisation of industry into larger units would lead to reforms
involving more restrictive rules, alwaysadvocated by some. The discussion started
in the late 1950's,l] reached a climax in the Report of the Donovan Commissionl2
and the White Paper - In Place of Strife, 13 which led to a debate giving a clear
indication of the lack of agreement in the Cabinet of what should be done. 14 Mter
the change of Government there was an abortive attempt to put in place a radical
new system, by means of the Industrial Relations Act 1971, repealed in 1974.15
This failure gave a temporary respite from the demand for change but since 1979
there has been a steady flow of legislation by the Conservative governments
pursuing a self-proclaimed 'step by step' series of reforms.]6 The aim of this
legislation was to remedy what were perceived as abuses. Secondary action,
picketing and the closed shop are notable examples of the targets for reform.
The changes have, as was to be expected, met with fierce opposition from the
trade unions who have found their powers very severely reduced, as was the
intention. The way in which the changes have been initiated, although typically
British in their pragmatic form, have created a serious problem. The rules seek to
regulate the actions of trade unions and their members and the approach to this has
been to make certain conduct hazardous, that is to say no longer protected by the
exemptions from the normal rules of law which has been the essential
underpinning of the right of trade unions to act and without which they could
9. A General Study was made on Conventions 87 and 98 in 1973.
10.The structure remained basically unaltered until 1971and was restored in its fundamentals forthe
period 1974to 1980.
II. A Giant's Strength, Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, 1958.
12. Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965-1968, Cmnd. 3623.
13.In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations (1969), Cmnd. 3888.
14.Entertainingly recorded by Peter Jenkins and Charles Knight, The Battle of Downing Street (1970).
15. Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974. Although s. I resoundly repeals the earlier Act, a
significant part of it dealing with individual rights in respect of unfair dismissal was retained,
substantially unchanged.
16.The first Green Paper, Trade Union Immunities (1980), is also the last such Government publication
of this nature that has frankly put the differing arguments.
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never have been of any real effect. The contrast with the Industrial Relations Act
1971ismarked, for that statute attempted to lay down a coherent and systematised
set of rules which would clearly define the legitimate actions which a trade union
could take in pursuance of its policies. There has been no overt overall pattern to
the recent reforms which, as has already been emphasised, have been 'abuse
driven', defining what cannot be safely done but failing positively to indicate what
is permissible. It has become well-nigh impossible to answer the question, from
perusal of the legislation: when is a trade union able to organise a strike which will
enjoy legal protection? It may be possible to do so in the most general terms, but
practical detailed advice anticipating the legal consequences will be both
extremely complicated and hedged about with uncertainty.
The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the fundamental underlying
uncertainty which arises from the traditional shape of English law in this area. It is
apparent that without positive rules the basic law of contract inevitably presents
an insuperable obstacle to 'safe' strike action. Yet many legal commentators,
coming as they do from an examination of the history of the question in the courts,
reject radical change. They are right, as we shall see, in indicating that such change
is likely to be beset with a number of problems but they are not really problems
that cannot be overcome provided that a comprehensive approach is adopted and
protected from erosion by the inevitable flow of litigation. For that reason it is
important first to look at what is done in practice and on what assumptions.
Strikes and contract in practice
Although, because of the diversity of employment, it is never possible to put
forward a completely accurate account ofwhat happens in practice there are some
fairly clear fundamental 'rules' as to what the parties to industrial conflict
traditionally expect.
At the heart of the matter is the determination of the workforce, as a group and
usually led by a trade union, to put pressure upon an employer to change his ways
by withdrawing labour. The object in the vast majority of strikes is a 'trial by
strength'. The economic fortitude and the moral resolve of both sides will be
tested. The workers through the trade union are seeking an improvement in the
contract position of its members, the employer is wholly or partly resisting this.
It immediately becomes obvious that if all the variations are at this stage
incorporated into the equation the exercise of analysis gets completely out of hand.
There are, for example, a range of actions that apply similar pressure without
going as far as a strike; some strikes are only indirectly connected with terms and
conditions of employment, such as the attempt to have a dismissed colleague,
thought to be unfairly treated, reinstated; action can be taken abruptly or with a
semblance of legality - honouring the spirit of the contract of service by giving
'strike notice', or making the intention clear by holding discussion of the problem
at length with the employer.
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Yet the underlying attitudes are consistent and clear in the vast majority of
cases. The workers, with a genuine feeling of injustice - (again to talk of political
and other motives at this stage unnecessarily blurs the issue), exasperated at the
inflexibility of the employer - (again 'wildcat strikes' have to be acknowledged as a
considerable feature of the scene but require separate treatment as excesses
whatever the rules), are prepared to risk their future employment prospects by
strike action. They are testing the employer's power and resolve, just as the
employer in many cases may be deliberately delaying improving the contracts of
service until he sees 'a pressing need to do so'. The workers, believing that they
have a genuine grievance, which may of course not necessarily be soundly based,
plainly expect the trial of strength to result in such improvement in their
contractual rights. Although there will always be militant workers and enthusiastic
trade unionists who, firmly wedded to the 'justice' of their cause, regard
compromise as 'sell out', compromise is the most likely outcome of these battles of
will to such an extent that it may be said to be the objective. Indeed the claim will
often recognise this by being pitched higher than the expectation.
Another set of variations, fatally attractive to the legal commentator, arises from
the form of the strike. It may be 'wildcat', that is to say taken by a group of
extremist workers without regard to any machinery available for settlement of
disputes; it may be 'official' but taken without regard to notice to the employer; or
it may be initiated only after the period of notice in the contract of employment has
been allowed to lapse. Each variation, and there are many others, has its own legal
conundrums, with precedents which tend to be sparse, contradictory and 'on their
own facts'. It is a morass to be avoided where an overview is sought.
The lack of clarity in the industrial relations 'rules of engagement' - the phrase is
used in its military rather than employment sense - has always been fuel for
political debate, much of it extreme and devoid of reality. Reformers, believing
that they are dealing with a legal topic, soon find themselves in a veritable slough of
despond or a fascinating logical exercise, according to taste. It will be always so
unless there is a clear underlying consensus on what is sought. Those who seek an
end to disruption ignore history, ignore the fact that there are bad, ruthless
employers ready to exploit and above all they ignore the fact that industrial
relations is dynamic and will by the very process of the lapse of time produce
problems that require attention to and revision of the contract of employment.
Indeed it is interesting to note that the need for change will be felt more widely by
the employer than the worker, who will tend to concentrate upon a narrow range of
terms such as pay and hours of work. Equally those who would see a general 'right
to strike' are reluctant to admit the necessity for a system that seeks to ensure as far
as possible that change is achieved as peacefully as possible and tend to reject, as
derogation, procedures or interventions by third parties which seek to ensure that
open strife occurs only where it is unavoidable. Strikes, however regulated, should
be regarded as pathological whereas some would wish to see them as an important
feature of a progressive system.
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That accepted, it is relatively simple to devise a sensible outline for the
relationship. It would involve, as can be found in most industrial countries, a
legally binding collective agreement of reasonable length - practice would favour
one or two years. That contract would determine the principal, general terms and
conditions of workers without inhibiting a second level of group or individual
terms being added as agreed. It would end on the due date and there would be a set
period, prior to that date set aside for negotiation. That period would be subject to
outside constraints - the need to use, where appropriate, third party intervention
and so on. If the matter remained deadlocked, then strikes would be permitted,
within a framework of safeguard and controls - such as ballots and protection of
essential services.
One of the weaknesses of legally binding collective agreements of a set term is
that they tend to inhibit change. Circumstances will force either side, at any time,
to feel that it would be wrong to wait until the contract ends for revision of some of
the terms of the agreement. Here the British problems come to the fore. It might
be felt necessary that the 'end of contract' position could, in proper circumstances,
be put into play - to allow action against refusal to amend working practices
enshrined in the collective agreement where the employer's business would be
under real threat without change, or to allow an allegedly dangerous practice
introduced into a workshop. Both might be felt to need action before the collective
agreement allowed it.
Once that is accepted, the individual contract of service has to be so constructed
as to support that system, rather than provide a separate method of challenge to it.
The law has so far under the present rules made no clear effort to achieve this
co-ordination, presumably because the matter has never been seriously addressed
in this way.
The Law
Not surprisingly the basic assumption is that the parties to the employment
contract have set out the principal terms they deem to be necessary. Yet this is
rarely so and great reliance is placed upon terms applied by implication, often
under the guise of 'custom and practice'. For example, the employer on occasion
will have no work for the employee and 'lay him off'. Such a situation is often
covered in a collective agreement, as the relevant trade union attempts to give
some limited measure of protection to its members, which will by incorporation
form part of their contracts of service. Failing such provisions the common law
position depends upon implication by the courts of a term and can be said to be
'unclear' .17 This lackof clarity cannot be allowed to pass without the remark that it
is an outrageous lacuna in the law which 'the law', whatever that might be; has
17. See, e.g. , the discussion in Smith & Wood, Industrial Law 4th Ed., at p.389 et seq. on layoff and
short time - a typical 'custom and practice' area.
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failed to fill. To leave it to the parties, well knowing that they are not likely in very
many cases to give it attention, calls out for a legal rule rather than a post hoc
implication of a term.18 It is becoming less and less satisfactory to say that the
matter can be left to collective bargaining as the number of workers covered
declines.
The same uncertainty applies to strikes, except that it is much harder to imagine
the courts implying a contractual term giving some measure of contractual
protection to the striking worker. Indeed Wedderburn says "in Britain it is rare to
find they have not occasioned breaches of contract". 19 The widespread use of
strike notices has no marked impact on the legal position despite their common
use. Again in Wedderburn's words, "there is no belief more widespread, more
reasonable, but legally more erroneous, than that held by many managers and
most workers that a strike notice, equivalent in length to that needed to end the
contract, makes industrial action lawful."20
Individual precedents are oflimited value since they arise in special situations
and concern a contract shaped personally by the parties. Thus the most recent case
to look generally at the problem, concerned the right to a redundancy payment
that would depend on there being a continuing contract, despite a strike. Mter a
review of the precedents it was accepted that going on strike could be treated by an
employer as a breach of contract, irrespective of strike notice having been given.
The possibility that the contract should be regarded in those circumstances as
suspended was put to the court but rejected.
Morgan v. Fry
The concept of the suspended contract forms an important part of the earlier
case of Morgan v. Fry.2J There had already been a recognition by Lord Devlin in
Rookes v. Barnard 22that in reality the striker hoped to keep the contract alive for as
long as possible. This point was developed by Lord Denning. The crux of the case
was the effect of the strike notice, ofa week's duration, that had been given. It had
indicated an unwillingness to work with non-union labour. In a previous case,
Lord Denning had dealt with a similar situation and had considered that such a
notice on the part of a trade union official was a threat to induce the members to
break their contracts and was intimidation of the employer. Although logical,
Lord Denning saw the flaw - saying "if that argument were correct, it would do
away with the right to strike in this country." He took the view that for over 60
years there had been a right to strike provided that sufficient notice was given. He
18. For a fairly recent example, seePuuick v.John Wrighr & Sons (Blackwall) Ltd. [1972] I.c.R. 457.
19. The Worker and rhe Law 3rd. Ed., at p.191.
20. Ibid. See, supra, n. 19.
21. [1968] 2 Q.B. 710.
22. [1968] 2 Q.B. 710.
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cited instances to be found in reported case law.23
Lord Denning set out clearly the legal basis for his decision:
"The men can leave their employment altogether by giving a week's notice
to terminate it. That would be a strike which would be perfectly lawful.
... The truth is that neither employer nor workmen wish to take the
drastic act of termination if it can be avoided. The men do not wish to leave
their work for ever. The employers do not wish to scatter their labour force
to the four winds. Each side is, therefore, content to accept a 'strike notice' of
proper length as lawful. It is an implication written into the contract of
modern law as to trade disputes. If a strike takes place, the contract of
employment is not terminated. It is suspended during the strike and revives
again when the strike is over."
This view was, to say the least, controversial. Although Davies LJ appears to
have agreed on the point with Lord Denning, Russell LJ said:
"I would not go so far as to say that a strike notice, provided the length is
not less than that required to determine the contracts, cannot involve a
breach of those contracts, even when the true view is that it is intended while
not determining the contract not to comply with the terms or some of the
terms of it during its continuance."
Lord Denning's view did not prevail. It did not even get a warm welcome. The
leading writer on the contract of employment, Freedland, said "The viewof Lord
Denning is questionable upon historical grounds, though defensible upon policy
grounds."24 Not surprisingly in a legal text, "historical grounds" means what is to
be found in the reports rather than how employers generally behaved. There had
been a rejection of the view, later put by Lord Denning, in Parkin v. South Hetton
Coal Co. Ltd ..25Lord Wedderburn, having looked at the complexity of such a rule
in his evidence to the Donovan Commission, took the view that Denning's
approach had too many complexities to be workable. His conclusion, in his text
book, is that it was "a bold if misconceived effort to invent a doctrine whereby, in
the modern lawof trade disputes, a term is implied into contracts such that, after a
strike notice, the contract is suspended during the strike and revives again when
the strike is over." This is difficult to reconcile with the further expression of
opinion that "even so, he was right to say there cannot be a right to strike without
23.Allen v.Flood [1898] A.C. I;White v.Riley [1921] I Ch. 1- cases which were not disapproved in
Rook~s v.Barnard. An inadequate notice would not have this effect according to two Irish cases: Cooper
v.Mlllea andOrs [1938] l.R. 749 and Riordan v. Butler and Ors [1940] I.R. 347. The notice inRookes v.
Barnard was also of inadequate length.
24. The Contract of Employment, Oxford (1976), at p.l03.
25. (1907) 97 L.T. 98.
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some doctrine superseding the employment contract."26
The difficulties referred to by Lord Wedderburn are set out in paragraph 943 of
the Donovan Report. They appear on reflection precisely the sort of difficulties of
detail that are inevitable where a rule oflaw is meant to apply to the infinite variety
of employment contracts. There is no doubt that it is true that "considerable
technical difficulties would be encountered". The law seems to live with technical
difficulties, as the case law on unfair dismissal indicates. Indeed, unless it is
determined to allow the application of principle, complexity inevitably flows from
the attempt to apply a tightly drafted 'law' to a multiplicity of varying facts. In
conclusion the Commission felt that the undoubted complexities meant that "a
unilateral right to suspend a contract of employment should not be introduced
except after prior examination of the whole problem and its possible repercussions
by an expert Committee."
Current position
The failure to follow this up has not had too great an effect because of an
important rule in unfair dismissal. It has already been explained that where strikes
were settled it was usual for the employer and trade union to agree that the workers
would be taken back without penalty, such as loss of seniority or continuity of
employment for various purposes. The rules of unfair dismissal assisted in this
process. Fairness dictated that where a strike had taken place and the disagreement
had been settled there should be no discrimination against individuals, whether as
'ringleaders', 'activists' or whatever. This was enshrined in the original rules laid
down by the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and is now to be found in s. 620fthe
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, amended by the Employment
Act 1984. A claim can be brought unless the employer has dismissed all those
taking part in the action at the same establishment and has not offered re-
engagement to any of them within three months of the date of their dismissal. This
rule applies whether the action was official or unofficial. Obviously the inability to
target individuals was a fetter on the way some employers would wish to act. In its
latest Green Paper, Unofficial Action and the Law,21 the Government has
announced its proposal to repeal this rule and to re-inforce the employer's position
by providing that the statutory immunities will not be available in respect of
industrial action the reason for which is to bring pressure on an employer in
support of anyone dismissed while taking part in unofficial industrial action.
In one of the 'headline' disputes, that between the printing unions and the
Murdoch newspapers it was disclosed by a newspaper 'leak' that the employer had
been advised of his right to dismiss all his workforce without fear of compensation
provided none were re-engaged. Since the plans of the employer involved
recruiting at least a number of workers, not being members of the print unions, it
. 26. The Worker and the Law, at p.192 el seq.
27. Cmnd. 821, Depanment of Employment, October 1989, Chapter 3.
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was consistent with his aims to follow this advice. Where, however, an employer
could not consider losing all or most of his workforce, such action was not
practical. Now, however, it is proposed that the employer shall have a free choice
as to which of the strikers he will refuse to continue in his employment. The threat
will no doubt prove to be a powerful restraint on strike action.
Conclusions
There can, at the present time, be little general agreement as to the desirable
position. Few would support an unfettered right to strike, many would want to see
striking regarded as a serious challenge to the employer, not to be lightly used,
whereas too many appear to regard any rules that make striking difficult or even
hazardous as beneficial.
These views are held against a background oflaw that is, it can be said without
exaggeration, unclear, exceptionally complicated, and illogical. It would be, in
many situations, hazardous to speculate how the courts may subsequently analyse
and reactto any particular set of actions. This is no doubt one of the reasons for the
hesitation of the Donovan Commission in attempting to suggest a remedy.
It is clear that the idea that the contract be regarded as suspended merits further
consideration. The changes in the law of strikes, especially the requirement of a
strike ballot as the basis for protection, make it easier to contemplate extension of
clearer legal consequences. It can hardly be expected that an ordinary worker,
asked by his union to strike on say a simple matter such as a disputed level of pay
rise, can contemplate that such action should lead to a loss of his job. Indeed it is
unlikely that he will be dismissed, but now that he lacks almost any protection his
position must be prudently regarded as precarious.
Judges such as Lord Devlin and Lord Denning, who have the reputation of
considering the impact of the law, have, as has been mentioned, both indicated
that suspension of the contract of employment more nearly describes the reality of
the situation. Such suspension need not be of unlimited duration. It can be refined
so as to take into account the difficulties foreseen by the Donovan Commission. It
can be limited to meet the objections of those who may see it as an open ended
'right to strike'. The time, however, has surely come to look again at Denning's
bold, and perhaps not misguided, opinion.
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